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The Cyber Intelligence Challenge of Asyngnotic Networks
Abstract
The intelligence community is facing a new type of organization, one enabled by the
world’s information and communications infrastructure. These asyngnotic networks
operate without leadership and are self-organizing in nature. They pose a threat to national
security because they are difficult to detect in time for intelligence to provide adequate
warning. Social network analysis and link analysis are important tools but can be
supplemented by application of neuroscience principles to understand the forces that drive
asyngnotic self-organization and triggering of terrorist events. Applying Living Systems
Theory (LST) to a terrorist attack provides a useful framework to identify hidden
asyngnotic networks. There is some antecedent work in propaganda analysis that may help
uncover hidden asyngnotic networks, but computerized SIGINT methods face a number of
challenges.
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Introduction
In June of 2014, someone leaked to the press that the infamous computer
hacking group, Anonymous, was preparing to start operation NO2ISIS to
strike against supporters of the Islamic State of Syria and al-Sham (ISIS).1
The anonymous source stated:
“We plan on sending a straightforward message to Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar and all other countries that evidently supply ISIS for
their own gain,” the source said. “In the next few days we will begin
defacing the government websites of these countries so that they
understand this message clearly. We are unable to target ISIS because
they predominately fight on the ground. But we can go after the people
or states who fund them.”2
One of the motivating factors behind this attack appears to be that the Twitter
feed @theanonmessage had been taken over by ISIS and used to distribute
graphic images of violence. On January 22, 2015, it was reported that the
Anonymous “Red Cult Team” had taken down ISIS websites in response to
the murder of the Charlie Hebdo journalists in Paris. An Anonymous twitter
feed @OpCharlieHebdo confirmed that the website ansar-alhaqq.net had
been “taken down,”3 as well as other ISIS websites.4
This faceless cyber-war quickly escalated. By February 8, 2015, Anonymous5
reported that it had taken control of “dozens of Twitter and Facebook
Hamill, J., “Anonymous hacktivists prepare for strike against ISIS ‘supporters,’” (2014)
Forbes, available at:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasperhamill/2014/06/27/anonymous-hacktivistsprepare-for-strike-against-isis-supporters/.
2 A full text of the Anonymous statement is at the end of this paper.
3 Vandita, 2015a, Anonymous takes down ISIS websites, confirms leaked government
documents were real, We Are Anonymous website, available at:
http://www.anonhq.com.
4 The list was included in a number of tweets: “#Target joinalqarda.com 144.76.97.176
#TANGODOWN; #Target alintibana.net 144.76.97.176 #TANGODOWN; #Target
opcharliehebdo.com 104.28.7.87 (Imposter Website)#TANGODOWN; #Target
islaam.com 97.74.45.128 #TANGODOWN; #Target Qa3edon.100free.com
205.134.165.186 #TANGODOWN; #Target daulahisamiyah.net 119.81.24.187
#TANGODOWN; #Target ansar1.info 79.172.193.108 #TANGODOWN; and #Target
jhuf.net 104.28.20.19 #TAN- GODOWN”. Note: The term “#TANGODOWN” is
Anonymous reporting that the site had been taken down. One assumes that “tango” is the
call sign for the letter “T” abbreviating “taken”.
5 Anonymous is a loosely associated international network of activist and hacktivist
entities. It does not have a leadership structure.
1

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

107

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 3

accounts” that had been used by ISIS to spread their influence through social
media.6 Anonymous released a video on YouTube openly threatening ISIS:
“We will hunt you, take down your sites, accounts, emails, and expose
you. From now on, no safe place for you online . . . You will be treated
like a virus, and we are the cure . . . We own the Internet . . . We are
Anonymous; we are Legion; we do not forgive, we do not forget, Expect
us.”7
It then identified 90 twitter accounts and 12 Facebook accounts that “appear
to be in close contact with ISIS”. Shortly after this information was released,
both Twitter and Facebook took down the accounts. If this had been a kinetic
war, these actions would have been equivalent to severely degrading
command and control by taking out a major telecommunications center.
Only a few days later, February 19th, 2015, Anonymous reported that its
#OpISIS operation was in “Round 2” and had “exposed thousands of ISIS
accounts to show that it is not that difficult to fight back against ISIS online”8
(emphasis added). It also provided a list of 3,030 accounts that it had handed
over to Twitter with the message “do your job” [and suspend the accounts].9
Anonymous then released a video stating that its actions were “to show what
your governments are not doing” (emphasis added). By February 25, it was
reporting on “#OpISIS Round 4” with the headline “Anonymous Beats United
States in Combating Terrorism”. Then in a stunning move, it released for
anyone wishing to view it, a list containing the contact information, IDs,
usernames, passwords and other information for all members of a leading
ISIS website.10

CoNN, 2015. Anonymous “hacktivists” strike a blow against ISIS. We Are Anonymous
website www.anonhq.com; Blair, L., 2015. Anonymous says ISIS is not Muslim, hacks
hundreds of ISIS accounts online; says ‘we are Muslims, we are Christians’. The Christian
Post , np.
7 Anonymous, 2015. Anonymous #OpISIS continues. YouTube video posting.
8 Vandita, 2015b. #OpISIs Round 2: Anonymous hacks thousands of ISIS accounts. We
Are Anonymous website www.anonhq.com.
9 David, Z., 2015. Anonymous hacks more ISIS accounts than ever, after U.S.
government and Twitter refuse to act. Counter Current News , np.
10 You can view the list at: http://http://pastebin.com/rbq8s4GM. The data included
“id”, “username”, “password”, “category”, “name”, “timeslogin”, “refered”, “credits”,
“sizedownloaded”, “expirydate”, “registrationdate” for a large number of accounts. See
Team, A.R.C., 2015, #OpISIS – database hacked by Anonymous Red Cult Team.
Pastebin.com.
6
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It appears that the #OpISIS operation conducted by Anonymous was a
success. These operations were conducted with a large amount of technical
skill, and have been timely. But who is doing the work? Who is Anonymous?
How is it organized, and are there other groups operating in the same way?
Can such an organization wage a cyber war more effectively than the world’s
nation-states? Has it been more effective than the U.S. Cyber Command or its
counterpart in other countries?11?
This paper argues that the intelligence community is facing a new type of
organization, one enabled by the world’s information and communications
infrastructure, and not having the traditional characteristics of any
organization known before. These networks of persons operate without
leadership. They communicate using both controlled and open un-controlled
paths for handling information, and they organize themselves in an
unconscious (un-planned) way. They are self-organizing networks. What is
peculiar is that these networks, such as Anonymous, appear to be highly
effective, but do not share any of the characteristics of a typical organization.12
That is, the individual components of a legacy terrorist network such as an
identifiable leadership structure for command and control is not present.
Apart from Anonymous, we can see this type of organization in other places as
well. It is present in broad social movements such as Occupy Wall Street, the
Arab Spring, Internet policy coalitions, and anti-globalization drives. It is
apparent in ISIS recruiting through social media, where we see what appear
to be random youth in developed Western countries give up their entire life
and manner of living to join the caliphate and its uncertain future.13 No one
yet fully understands how these convincing communications take place and
why unexpected recruits from around the world are joining the caliphate to
fight, even without explicit orders. This is because the ISIS phenomenon is
working in the same self-organizing way.14

The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is an armed forces sub-unified
command subordinate to the United States Strategic Command. It is located in Fort
Meade, Maryland at NSA.
12 See the related discussion in Cetina (2005) who writes about “microstructures”
forming networks.
13 The ISIS phenomenon outside of Iraq and Syria is operating in an asyngnotic way; but
at home, ISIS is operating with a typical organizational form.
14 ISIS as an organization operating in Iraq and Syria has a classical organizational form,
e.g., a leader, assistants, functional specialization, command and control. It is the wider
ISIS phenomenon that is characterized by asyngnosis and asyngnotic behavior.
11
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In order to examine this type of shadowy organization, we propose a simple
framework that we call ‘Asyngnosis’. The word is constructed from Greek: α(not) + συνειδιτος- (conscious) + γνοσι- (knowledge, information); and
describes the undirected emergence of knowledge and other interconnected
pathways that form around a specific idea or activity. We would argue that an
‘Asyngnodic’ (+ δικτυο - grid or network) (an asyngnotic network) may
describe many complex organizational activities, particularly decision-making
and operations. Decisions and strategies may be modeled as not the outcome
of a complex, structured set of discrete activities or processes, but instead as
the product of continuous (non-discrete) flows of information, ideas and
impressions (‘memes’)15 along ever-changing communication pathways tying
together individuals and organizations. Much like the pathways between
neurons in the brain, these networks are characterized by their constant
formation, strengthening, weakening, and disappearance based on use and
need, yet as these connections and disconnections take place, the organization
itself constantly changes.16
Both the continuous flow of memes and the constant reconfiguration of these
networks takes place not only between individuals, but between individuals
and organizations, and between the organizations themselves without regard
to national, cultural, or even linguistic boundaries. Thus, in its simplest form,
Asyngnosis combines four concepts: a) memes (information, concepts,
impressions); b) a continuous nature (non-discrete events); c) networks
(communication paths; influence paths; sensory paths); d) plasticity
(spontaneous reconfigurablity) and ad hoc formation and dissolution).
In the remainder of this article, we will review several approaches used in
intelligence to analyze networks of criminals, terrorists or other persons or
organizations who threaten national security. We will show that these
techniques, although powerful, fail to address the specific challenges of the
asyngnotic form of network. Next, we will discuss the nature of asyngnotic
behavior. After that, we will present a short example of how an asyngnotic
network approach could be used to understand the Charlie Hebdo terrorist
attack in Paris. Here we use a parallel in Living Systems Theory (LST) to
make an initial identification of unseen networks. LST is reviewed briefly in
the appendix.
15 Ferguson (Ferguson, N., “Networks and hierarchies,” The American Interest (2014) 9,
16–24) also mentions memes.
16 To see this pattern in the activities of Anonymous or other hacker groups, it is only
necessary to examine the shifting pattern of content over the years.
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We will then discuss the intelligence challenges for automated collection and
analysis of intelligence data needed to anticipate this type of event. Much of
our approach is based on neuroscience, because some of its underlying theory
regarding the brain, including quantitative measurements of action
potentials, might be used to model the information flow and SIGINT
characteristics of self-learning leaderless networks.

Current Intelligence Approaches
Theory of Social Networks
The analysis of social networks has a rich history starting with the work of
Ëmile Durkheim, considered to be the father of sociology. Some of the
earliest work in diagramming and network analysis focused on derivation of a
social structure. It was considered that “the dynamic meaning of chainrelations in social structure is better understood in view of a network
hypothesis.”17 Early studies examined how information is passed through
social networks18 and these models also were useful for understanding
diffusion of innovation, spread of a disease, cognitive social structures,19 the
abstract idea of social capital,20 and even sexual behavior.21 Study of the
strength of ties between persons was found to influence how well a message
could be propagated (wider propagation with weaker ties).22 Over time, these
methods became computerized, and the rise of social network analysis may
have come with the rise of social media.

Analysis of Social Media
The rapid growth of social media has provided an important platform for
social network analysis, because an adequate amount of information is
available openly online. These giant social networks are easy to view because
Moreno, J.L., Jennings, H.H., “Statistics of social configurations,” Sociometry (1938)
1, pp. 342–374. These first social networks are literally hand-drawn in the journals, very
different from today’s outputs from computerized mapping software.
18 Rapoport, A., “Spread of information through a population with socio- structural bias:
I. assumption of transitivity,” The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics (1953) 15, 523–
533; Rapoport, A., “A study of a large sociogram,” Behavioral Science (1961) 6, 279–291.
19 Krackhardt, D., “Cognitive social structures,” Social Networks (1987) 9, 109 – 134.
20 Burt, R.S., “The contingent value of social capital,” Administrative Science Quarterly
(1997) 42, 339.
21 Laumann, E.O., “A 45-year retrospective on doing networks,” Connections (2006) 27,
65–90.
22 Granovetter, M.S., “The strength of weak ties,” American Journal of Sociology (1973)
78, 1360–1380.
17
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automation can be used to collect massive amounts of data. Indeed, social
networks such as Facebook, Google+, or LinkedIn have publicly visible data
that reveals every “friend” a person is connected to as well as a record of their
interactions and indicators of similarity. Using this information, it is possible
automatically to data-mine social networks and correlate the derived network
structure surrounding an individual or group with other known information
describing the participating individuals, e.g., preferences, location, sex,
etcetera. For example, many have studied how social media can be used by
businesses to develop next generation products23 or assess whether a product
is appropriate to sell online24. Other applications include customer
relationship management,25 identification of promising investments,26 and
identification of stakeholder groups that may influence corporate policy.27
Because of its effect on how consumers purchase online,28 much work has
been done on recommendation systems,29 word-of-mouth evaluations,30

Li, Y.M., Chen, H.M., Liou, J.H., Lin, L.F., “Creating social intelligence for product
portfolio design,” Decision Support Systems (2014) 66, 123 – 134; Lau, R.Y., Li, C., Liao,
S.S., “Social analytics: Learning fuzzy product ontologies for aspect-oriented sentiment
analysis,” Decision Support Systems (2014) 65, 80 – 94. Crowdsourcing and Social
Networks Analysis.
24 Verbraken, T., Goethals, F., Verbeke, W., Baesens, B., “Predicting online channel
acceptance with social network data,” Decision Support Systems 63 (2014) 104 – 114. 1.
Business Applications of Web of Things 2. Social Media Use in Decision Making.
25 van Dam, J.W., van de Velden, M., “Online profiling and clustering of Facebook
users,” Decision Support Systems (2015) 70, 60 – 72.
26 Gottschlich, J., Hinz, O., “A decision support system for stock investment
recommendations using collective wisdom,” Decision Support Systems (2014) 59, 52 –
62.
27 Jiang, S., Chen, H., Nunamaker, J.F., Zimbra, D., “Analyzing firm-specific social
media and market: A stakeholder-based event analysis framework,” Decision Support
Systems (2014) 67, 30 – 39.
28 Gao, J., Zhang, C., Wang, K., Ba, S., “Understanding online purchase decision making:
The effects of unconscious thought, information quality, and information quantity,”
Decision Support Systems (2012) 53, 772 – 781. 1) Computational Approaches to
Subjectivity and Sentiment Analysis 2) Service Science in Information Systems Research :
Special Issue on {PACIS} 2010.
29 Li, X., Wang, M., Liang, T.P., “A multi-theoretical kernel-based approach to social
network-based recommendation,” Decision Support Systems (2014) 65, 95 – 104.
Crowdsourcing and Social Networks Analysis.; Geiger, D., Schader, M., “Personalized task
recommendation in crowdsourcing information systems — current state of the art,”
Decision Support Systems (2014) 65, 3 – 16. Crowdsourcing and Social Networks
Analysis.; Liao, H.Y., Chen, K.Y., Liu, D.R., “Virtual friend recommendations in virtual
worlds,” Decision Support Systems (2015) 69, 59 – 69.
30 Zhang, Z., Li, Q., Zeng, D., Gao, H., “User community discovery from multi-relational
networks,” Decision Support Systems (2013) 54, 870 – 879.; Chang, H.H., Tsai, Y.C.,
Wong, K.H., Wang, J.W., Cho, F.J., “The effects of response strategies and severity of
failure on consumer attribution with regard to negative word-of-mouth,” Decision
Support Systems (2015) 71, 48 – 6.; Bao, T., Chang, T.L., “Finding disseminators via
electronic word of mouth message for effective marketing communications,” Decision
23
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product reviews,31 and the effects of social media on the reputation of a
business32 or public opinion in general.33 Some work has attempted to
explore social media as a prediction market.34
Much of this work is done using text mining to uncover information about
social media users.35 It has been recognized that social media may have a
strong effect on the behavior of individuals. Some have explored nonconscious intentions,36 why people keep coming back to social media,37
psychological addiction,38 and maladaptive cognition.39 Individuals exhibit
Support Systems (2014) 67, 21 – 29.; Cheung, C.M., Thadani, D.R., “The impact of
electronic word-of-mouth communication: A literature analysis and integrative model,”
Decision Support Systems (2012) 54, 461 – 470.
31 Bao, T., Chang, T.L., “Finding disseminators via electronic word of mouth message for
effective marketing communications,” Decision Support Systems (2014a) 67, 21 – 29.;
Yu, H., Shen, Z., Miao, C., An, B., Leung, C., “Filtering trust opinions through
reinforcement learning,” Decision Support Systems (2014) 66, 102 – 113.; Ku, Y.C., Wei,
C.P., Hsiao, H.W., “To whom should I listen? Finding Reputable Reviewers in Opinionsharing Communities,” Decision Support Systems (2012) 53, 534 – 542.
32 Vavilis, S., Petkovi ́c, M., Zannone, N., “A Reference Model for Reputation Systems,”
Decision Support Systems (2014) 61, 147 – 154.; Schniederjans, D., Cao, E.S.,
Schniederjans, M., “Enhancing Financial Performance with Social Media: An Impression
Management Perspective,” Decision Support Systems (2013) 55, 911 – 918. 1. Social
Media Research and Applications 2. Theory and Applications of Social Networks.; da
Silva, N.F., Hruschka, E.R., Jr., E.R.H., “Tweet Sentiment Analysis with Classifier
Ensembles,” Decision Support Systems (2014) 66, 170 – 179.
33 Tian, R.Y., Liu, Y.J., “Isolation, Insertion, and Reconstruction: Three Strategies to
Intervene in Rumor Spread Based on Supernetwork Model,” Decision Support Systems
(2014) 67, 121 – 130.
34 Qiu, L., Rui, H., Whinston, A., “Social Network-Embedded Prediction Markets: The
Effects of Information acquisition and communication on predictions,” Decision Support
Systems (2013) 55, 978 – 987. 1. Social Media Research and Applications 2. Theory and
Applications of Social Networks.
35 Lu, H.M., “Detecting short-term cyclical topic dynamics in the user- generated content
and news,” Decision Support Systems (2015) 70, 1 – 14.
36 Zhao, K., Stylianou, A.C., Zheng, Y., “Predicting users’ continuance intention in
virtual communities: The dual intention-formation processes,” Decision Support
Systems, (2013) 55, 903 – 910. 1. Social Media Research and Applications 2. Theory and
Applications of Social Networks.
37 Gwebu, K.L., Wang, J., Guo, L., “Continued usage intention of multi- functional friend
networking services: A test of a dual-process model using Facebook,” Decision Support
Systems (2014) 67, 66 – 77.; Al-Debei, M.M., Al-Lozi, E., Papazafeiropoulou, A., “Why
people keep coming back to Facebook: Explaining and predicting continuance
participation from an extended theory of planned behavior perspective,” Decision
Support Systems (2013) 55, 43 – 54.; Sun, Y., Fang, Y., Lim, K.H., “Understanding
sustained participation in transactional virtual communities,” Decision Support Systems
(2012) 53, 12 – 22; Cheung, C.M., Lee, M.K., “A theoretical model of intentional social
action in online social networks,” Decision Support Systems (2010) 49, 24 – 30.
38 Wang, C., Lee, M.K., Hua, Z., “A theory of social media dependence: Evidence from
microblog users,” Decision Support Systems (2015) 69, 40 – 49.
39 Ibid.
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different leadership styles in online communities,40 they disclose probably too
much information about themselves,41 and use different habits in making
decisions.42 Content analysis can be used to discover a variety of social roles
assumed online.43 Some work has used automated tools to examine the
effects and operations of social networks including allocation of workflows,44
span of control as a function of trust,45 and the functions of online support
communities.46
Finally, a significant amount of work has been done in developing automated
tools for exploration of the structure of social networks. Zhang47 used authortopic data to derive multi-relational networks in social media, and Zhou48
showed it is possible to discover implicit social networks. Han49 was able to
mine Facebook data and uncover individual preferences and interests. Other
work in data mining50 has focused on identification of friendships,51
inferences of shared interests between individuals,52 identification of
gatekeepers and subgroups,53 organizational structure54 and knowledge
Templeton, G.F., Luo, X.R., Giberson, T.R., Campbell, N., “Leader personal influences
on membership decisions in moderated online social networking groups,” Decision
Support Systems (2012) 54, 655 – 664.
41 Chen, R., “Living a private life in public social networks: An exploration of member
self-disclosure,” Decision Support Systems (2013) 55, 661 – 668.
42 Sadovykh, V., Sundaram, D., Piramuthu, S., “Do online social networks support
decision-making?” Decision Support Systems (2015) 70, 15 – 30
43 Lee, A.J., Yang, F.C., Tsai, H.C., Lai, Y.Y., “Discovering content-based behavioral roles
in social networks,” Decision Support Systems, (2014) 59, 250 – 261.
44 Bajaj, A., Russell, R., “Awsm: Allocation of workflows utilizing social network
metrics,” Decision Support Systems (2010) 50, 191 – 202.
45 Salas-Fumás, V., Sanchez-Asin, J.J., “Information and trust in hierarchies,” Decision
Support Systems (2013) 55, 988 – 999. 1. Social Media Research and Applications 2.
Theory and Applications of Social Networks.
46 Sutanto, J., Kankanhalli, A., Tan, B.C., “Uncovering the relationship between user
support networks and popularity,” Decision Support Systems, (2014) 64, 142 – 151
47 Zhang, Z., Li, Q., Zeng, D., Gao, H., “User community discovery from multi-relational
networks,” Decision Support Systems (2013) 54, 870 – 879.
48 Zhou, W., Duan, W., Piramuthu, S., “A social network matrix for implicit and explicit
social network plates,” Decision Support Systems (2014) 68, 89 – 97.
49 Han, X., Wang, L., Crespi, N., Park, S., Cuevas, A., “Alike people, alike interests?
Inferring interest similarity in online social networks,” (2015) Decision Support Systems
69, 92 – 106.
50 Chen, Y.L., Wu, Y.Y., Chang, R.I., “From data to global generalized knowledge,”
Decision Support Systems (2012) 52, 295 – 307.
51 Liao, H.Y., Chen, K.Y., Liu, D.R., “Virtual friend recommendations in virtual worlds,”
Decision Support Systems (2015) 69, 59 – 69
52 Han, X., Wang, L., Crespi, N., Park, S., Cuevas, A., “Alike people, alike interests?
Inferring interest similarity in online social networks,” Decision Support Systems (2015)
69, 92 – 106.
53 Zhu, B., Watts, S., Chen, H., “Visualizing social network concepts,” Decision Support
Systems (2010) 49, 151 – 161.
40
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flows.55 Although these techniques of analysis at first were developed in the
commercial sector, particularly advertising, some of the underlying
methodologies have turned out to be useful frameworks for intelligence, but
using an extended data set based on SIGINT.

Application of Network Analysis – Link Analysis and Complex
Correlation
As a type of applied social network theory, link analysis has been widely
exploited in intelligence analysis.56 Although earlier intelligence work was
done manually,57 in criminal intelligence, the concept of network centrality
has be used to identify vulnerabilities in criminal organization,58 identify false
identities,59 and find hidden networks and web communities.60 Link analysis
using a variety of attributes of hate group web sites has been used to map
affiliations between different groups of radicals,61 guerrillas62 and terrorists.63
There are important applications in combatting identity theft.64 There are

Qiu, J., Lin, Z., “A framework for exploring organizational structure in dynamic social
networks,” Decision Support Systems (2011) 51, 760 – 771. Recent Advances in Data,
Text, and Media Mining; Information Issues in Supply Chain and in Service System
Design.
55 Liu, D.R., Lin, C.W., Chen, H.F., “Discovering role-based virtual knowledge flows for
organizational knowledge support,” Decision Support Systems, (2013) 55, 12 – 30.
56 Senator, T.E., “Link mining applications: Progress and challenges,” (2005) SIGKDD
Explor. Newsl. 7, 76–83.
57 Harper, W.R., Harris, D.H., “The application of link analysis to police intelligence,”
Human Factors (1975) 17, 157–164; Chen, H., Chung, W., Xu, J.J., Wang, G., Qin, Y.,
Chau, M., “Crime data mining: a general framework and some examples,” Computer
(2004) 37, 50– 56.
58 Sparrow, M.K., “The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An
assessment of the prospects,” Social Networks, (1991) 13, 251 – 274
59 Boongoen, T., Shen, Q., Price, C., “Disclosing false identity through hybrid link
analysis,” Artificial Intelligence and Law (2010) 18, 77–102
60 Reid, E., 2003. “Using web link analysis to detect and analyze hidden web
communities.” Information and communications technology for competitive
intelligence, (2003) 57–84.
61 Zhou, Y., Reid, E., Qin, J., Chen, H., Lai, G., “US domestic extremist groups on the
web: link and content analysis,” Intelligent Systems, (2005) IEEE 20, 44–51.
62 Grau, L.W., “Something Old, Something New. Guerillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence
Analysis. Technical Report,” Army Combined Arms Center (2004)
63 Grau, L.W., “Something Old, Something New. Guerillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence
Analysis. Technical Report,” Army Combined Arms Center (2004); Popp, R., Armour, T.,
Senator, T., Numrych, K., “Countering terrorism with information technology,”
Communications of the ACM (2004) 47, 36–43.; McCulloh, I.A., Carley, K.M., Webb, M.,
“Social network monitoring of Al-Qaeda,” Network Science (2007) 1, 25–30.
64 Boongoen, T., Shen, Q., Price, C., “Disclosing false identity through hybrid link
analysis,” Artificial Intelligence and Law (2010) 18, 77–102.
54
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other applications in competitive65 intelligence.66 An important product of
link analysis combined with other methods is information rich 3D graphics.67
Intelligence using social media has been a growth area.68 All of these studies,
and others not mentioned, have made great progress in using social media to
find out about the users, and many times about their behavior. But as we
shall see next, asyngnotic networks operate in a different way, and so unless
significantly extended or improved, the techniques developed so far are not
sufficient to handle the full needs of intelligence analysis. Without new
techniques of analysis, asyngnotic networks will remain invisible.

Using Neuroscience Models to Understand Asyngnotic
Networks
Asyngnotic networks have several characteristics that are somewhat different
from other networks. As the structure and behavior of asyngnotic networks
constantly are in flux, it is difficult to predict how they work or when they will
strike. They are self-organizing, so any action may not be driven by a
detectable dispatch of a leader’s command. Instead, they act as if triggered by
an unknown force. As notions of leadership theory applied to any
65 Vaughan, L., You, J., “Content assisted web co-link analysis for competitive
intelligence,” Scientometrics (2008) 77, 433–444.; Ramakrishnan, T., Jones, M.C.,
Sidorova, A., “Factors influencing business intelligence (BI) data collection strategies: An
empirical investigation,” Decision Support Systems (2012) 52, 486 – 496.
66 The study used web co-link analysis to generate competitive maps in the WiMAX
industry. Reid (2003) identifies seven techniques of competitor analysis including
a) advertising analysis; b) alliance networks analysis; c) competitor profiling;
d) corporate culture analysis; e) futures-based analysis; f) media analysis; and
g) opportunity assessment.
67 Risch, J.S., May, R.A., Dowson, S.T., Thomas, J.J., “A virtual environment for
multimedia intelligence data analysis,” Computer Graphics and Applications, IEEE
(1996) 16, 33–41; Chin, G., Kuchar, O.P., Whitney, P.D., Powers, M.E., Johnson, K.E.,
“Graph-based comparisons of scenarios in intelligence analysis, in: Systems, Man and
Cybernetics,” 2004 IEEE International Conference on, IEEE. pp. 3175–3180.; Chung, H.,
Yang, S., Massjouni, N., Andrews, C., Kanna, R., North, C., 2010. VizCept: Supporting
synchronous collaboration for constructing visualizations in intelligence analysis., in:
IEEE VAST, pp. 107–114
68 There is an important discussion regarding privacy in the United States and how to
balance it against national security. See Omand, David, Jamie Bartlett, and Carl Miller.
"A balance between security and privacy online must be struck." Magdalen House 136
(2012); Jaeger, Paul T., Charles R. McClure, John Carlo Bertot, and John T. Snead. "The
USA PATRIOT Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and information policy
research in libraries: Issues, impacts, and questions for libraries and researchers." The
Library 74, no. 2 (2004); and Rovner, Joshua. "Intelligence in the Twitter
Age." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26, no. 2 (2013):
260-271
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organization hold that leadership is essential to its growth and effectiveness,
the fact that asyngnotic networks operate without leaders raises the question:
“If there is no leadership, then how does the asyngnotic network operate and
organize itself?” Since there also is no consistency in communication
pathways informing these networks, they may operate in a way that is
invisible to traditional link analysis that depends on pre-identified nodes to
“link” with common characteristics usually found through multi-linear
regression. Since their membership is not known, traditional social media
data mining tools are not as helpful. There is no “consciousness” in the
network as it is formed, and network formation is not driven by any strategy.
Another part of the mystery involves the constant change and propagation of
asyngnotic networks. What causes these changes, how do the changes take
place, and what are the forces that provide the energy for propagation?

Hebbian Plasticity
As asyngnotic networks operate in a way that is not unlike the phenomenon
associated with neurons found in the brain, we may look to neuroscience as a
reference framework for analysis. By transplanting into the intelligence world
models that describe the behavior of neurons, we can better locate and
understand the behavior of asyngnotic networks.
The Hebbian plasticity model69 refers to how the brain learns by
strengthening links between different neurons by constantly “re-wiring” itself.
This phenomena occurs naturally without leadership or direction. At the core
of this model is the effect of “action potentials”70 flowing from one neuron to
another. The more flow, the stronger the link. Analogously and with
reference to Hebbian plasticity, an asyngnotic network’s ability constantly to
change shape and configuration as it remains embedded in society is
facilitated by the constant flow of action potentials from one network node to
another. In neuroscience, these “nodes” are neurons; in an asyngnotic
network, they are individuals or component organizations that in counterterrorism parlance typically are referred to as “cells”. In the world of
neuroscience, the action potential is measured in millivolts, but in the
intelligence world, we will need to define these flows with reference to flows of
communications (emails, messages, telephone calls) or memes.71 The flow of
Hebb, D.O., The Organization of Behavior, Wiley (1949)
An action potential is the change in electrical potential associated with the passage of
an impulse along the membrane of a muscle cell or nerve cell.
71 Memes are an element of a culture or system of behavior that may be considered to be
passed from one individual to another by nongenetic means, especially imitation. Its
69
70
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memes is able to traverse the restrictive boundaries of any fixed
communication system. For example, memes can flow through the open
mass media as a type of signaling (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Meme Flows through Media.

In an asyngnotic network, streams of memes flow through the system at
unpredictable rates, and are aggregated in each operational cell. If the level of
meme stimulation equals or exceeds a threshold ◊, then the cell will trigger an
event, which would be an attack or any act in furtherance of a conspiracy.
The Hebbian plasticity model compels one to examine asyngnotic networks
by assessing the strength between different nodes in the network. Since more
meme flow means more strength connecting the nodes, and since any node
can be connected to any other node, it is crucial to find the strongest
connections. These stronger connections may highlight enough of the shadow
of the asyngnotic network to make it possible to detect.
Another application of the plasticity concept is in understanding how
asyngnotic networks learn and remember. This is made possible through the
stimulation and resultant strengthening of links between nodes caused by an
above average flow of memes. In the Hebbian concept, the “cell assembly” is
caused by repeated internal communications. In the intelligence world, “cell
assembly” would refer to the organizational structure of the terrorist or
criminal asyngnotic network.72 Memory, which we can equate to the
origin is μιμεμα (that which is imitated).
72 See also Kohenen, T., “Self-organization and Associative memory,” 1989 Springer-
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development of a sense of mission and shared goals by network members, is
made possible by the repeated stimulation of these connections so that they
have a type of reverberating activity. As a consequence, if any of the
networked nodes are stimulated by a matching meme, then the entire
network can become activated.73 The fact that stimulation of one highlylinked node will trigger action potentials in other highly-linked nodes is the
model of network memory. The stimulation of a node that is enough to
trigger action or memory happens when the level of meme flow crosses a
crucial threshold. This causes an action potential, which in intelligence terms
would refer to a part of the asyngnotic network taking specific actions in
furtherance of a conspiracy or carrying out a terrorist act.74

The Linear-Threshold Model for Network Decision Making
Another approach can be used to approximate decision-making in these
networks. Using the McCulloch-Potts approach75 it is possible to model a
simple computation (decision to act) made by a network node. This is done
by summing up all inflowing memes and expecting the node to take action if a
threshold were reached. One complication of this approach from the SIGINT
point of view is that it does not distinguish between different meme flow rates
and the fact that nodes receive memes from multiple paths (sources;
communication channels; media).
To think of this asyngnotic network as a decision making organization, one
only needs to think of the flowing memes as being “0” or “1” which
corresponds to false and true or “do not attack” and “attack”. The linearthreshold model is useful for taking into consideration the relative strength of
different pathways that transmit memes to an asyngnotic node. Since nodes
in a terrorist network receive messages either by traditional tradecraft routes
or through general impressions from the mass media, this model allows
analysis to set a value to multiple types of channels.
If intelligence is continuously monitoring a flow of memes over multiple
paths, then the stimulus can be graded along a continual scale, rather than
Verlag, Berlin.
73 This has a strange parallelism to the work by on viral phenomenon in social media in
which the opinions of one person become good predictors of others in the same network.
See Chesney, T., 2014. Networked individuals predict a community wide outcome from
their local information. Decision Support Systems 57, 11 – 21.
74 See the appendix for more on the mathematical expression of this model.
75 McCulloch, W.S., “The brain computing machine,” Electrical Engineering (1949) 68,
492–497.
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using only “true” or “false”. This would allow, for example, the frequency and
emotional content of messages to be accounted for. In addition, since the
monitoring would be continuous, then the effect on the cell receiving the
memes can be tracked over time, and thus at each instant. One nice aspect of
this approach is that using historical SIGINT data combined with records of
actions, it should be possible to quantify the θ value for a terrorist cell or any
other node in an asyngnotic network. The McCulloch-Pitts approach likely
would help explain instances of “self-indoctrination” in unexpected places,
such as the recent scandal at the École d l’Air in France where in April of
2015, it was discovered that several students of the French Air Force Academy
were planning to place bombs in a local mosque. Interviews revealed that
their motivations were entirely self-generated.

Perceptrons and Neocognitrons
The perceptron model76 and its progeny were developed as an explanation of
visual perception. The model involves multiple layers of neurons, with the
first layer being the input and the last the output. In neuroscience, the output
is equivalent to recognition of an object. Here we will equate recognition to
an event trigger for an asyngnotic network node that causes an overt act in
furtherance of a conspiracy, an enabling action (propaganda, logistics
support) or a criminal act including terrorism itself. Incoming memes flow
through a number of network layers, but no meme in itself is enough to pull
the trigger. At each layer in the network, the memes are processed in parallel,
but as they move through multiple channels.
Because no meme in itself is sufficient to trigger an overt act, no emerging act
can be anticipated if SIGINT processing does not employ this multi-channel
cascading model. One SIGINT advantage to the perceptron model, however,
is that it is necessary to model and process meme flows in only one direction.
Each node has orientation selectivity,77 and will pass on a trigger signal if the
level of memes is sufficient and the total exceeds the threshold. A crude
analogy to this is a keyword listening program. These nodes can also be
thought of as filters; everything but a meme stream carrying the correct

Rosenblatt, F., “The perceptron: a probabilistic model for information storage and
organization in the brain,” Psychological Review (1958) 65, 386; Rosenblatt, F.,
“Principles of Neurodynamics: Perceptrons and the Theory of Brain Mechanisms,”
Technical Report Report (1961) No. VG-1196-G-8. Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc..
Buffalo, NY.
77 Hubel, D.H., Wiesel, T.N., “Receptive fields, binocular interaction and functional
architecture in the cat’s visual cortex,” Journal of Physiology (1962)160, 106–154.
76
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orientation will be filtered out. There is another analogy to this in decisionmaking theory in which it is assumed that actors systematically will ignore
information that disagrees or is inconsistent with their preconceived notion.78
As a consequence, in the perceptron model, the final trigger is fired when
there is a recognition caused by compatible, and logically inter-locking meme
streams. The level of memes passing through to the next layer with a high
threshold node can either be non-selective or simulate a logical AND
operation requiring the receipt simultaneously of multiple (but different)
memes. If the node has a low threshold, it operates as a logical OR function,
because any one of a variety of memes can reach the threshold. Therefore, by
modeling nodes in a perceptron sequence, it is possible to have AND layers
followed by OR layers or any combination thereof.79
In order to use this model for intelligence, it is necessary to identify the meme
components graded by intensity of each trigger and classified according to
logical interconnectivity. Learning these recognition patterns can happen
only by use of historical meme flow data tied to a specific trigger and overt
act. The underlying framework of the neocognitron model80 should be useful
as a starting point for meme-trigger analysis.81

Aggregate Characteristics of Asyngnotic Networks
Several characteristics distinguish an asyngnotic network from other more
structured networks, making this phenomenon extremely difficult to monitor
and control. Perhaps the most important distinction is that asyngnotic
networks are self-organizing knowledge networks which enable a “meme” or
stimulus (i.e., event, idea, or image) to pass through a group or community in
Cook, M.B., Smallman, H.S., "Human factors of the confirmation bias in intelligence
analysis: Decision support from graphical evidence landscapes,” Human Factors: The
Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (2008) 50, 745–754; Nickerson,
R.S., “Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises,” Review of General
Psychology (1998) 2, 175.
79 Note that when nodes are linked together in an asyngnotic network, it is possible to
produce any function of Boolean logic e.g., AND, OR, NOT, or XOR. See appendix for
more on the mathematical expression of this model.
80 Fukushina, K.M., “Neocognitron: a self-organizing neural network model for a
mechanism of pattern recognition unaffected by shift in position,” Biological Cybernetics
(1980) 36, 193–202
81 See also the LeNet approach by LeCun. (LeCun, Y., Boser, B., Denker, J.S.,
Henderson, D., Howard, R.E., Hubbard, W., Jackel, L.D., “Backpropagation applied to
hand-written zip code recognition,” Neural Computing (1989) 1, 541–551). There are a
number of other neuroscience models that can be considered such as pattern completion,
interference between different “cell assemblies” and synaptic loops.
78
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an unstructured way. As the name implies, these networks provide a vehicle
for the expression of emerging—often unconscious—ideas, feelings and
motivations among network members. Since asyngnotic networks are not
permanent, they form and dissolve as the stimulus proceeds leaving few
traces beyond an affective residue in those touched by the process. Thus, in
some ways the spread of a meme through an asyngnotic network is like the
spread of a virus through a population; and like a virus, the meme changes as
it emerges and has different effects on those it encounters.82
This evolutionary property of asyngnotic networks is one reason why they are
so difficult to identify and map. The social media analysis and linking
techniques discussed above focus on the flow of information (or memes)
within and between individuals and groups, which assumes a more defined
target (meme) and more structured relationships than are typically found in
an evolving asyngnotic network. This does not, however, mean that these
techniques are without merit. Since asyngnotic networks support the
emergence of sometimes unconscious and latent feelings toward a particular
idea, image or subject, they are not in themselves vehicles for action. Instead,
any triggering action results from the transmission of the meme through
other, more established subsystems, which may be more amenable to being
surfaced using current intelligence tools. The residue of the asyngnotic
network may become visible when one or more members of an existing
(online or other) community are triggered by an emerging asyngnotic meme
so as to actively plan and communicate within the group their pending
reactions. Thus, in terms of the neurological models discussed above, an
asyngnotic network may alter (i.e., lower or raise) the action potential within
an established community by impacting the willingness of members to engage
(or dis-engage) in action of some kind.
Until recently, asyngnotic networks would have been considered informal
social networks for sharing ideas and “news” within a closed community. As
such, the techniques discussed above would provide a valuable window into
the fairly well defined or semi-permanent relationships between cells or
individuals. The emergence of these networks, however, is a consequence of
ongoing advances in telecommunications and social media that allow
members of any given community to be concurrent members of any number
of unrelated groups. As a result, a meme can travel through the global
population (consciousness) in a discontinuous, unpredictable way, jumping
82 This is not unsimilar to the “telephone” game in which persons pass from one to
another a sentence, but as it is passed along, it is changed.
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from one network to another, leaving multifarious effects within the specific
communities it touches. In other words, the same meme may have vastly
different impacts on the individuals and communities it reaches. For
example, it might cause the temporary linkages of networks, even when prior
to that time there was no planned or realized connection. This partially
explains how self-organization works.
The flow of memes can be powerful. For example, the ISIS beheading videos
leave an indeterminate affective impression on the individuals who view
them. They educate and influence, but without any advance planning of a
target for their influence. These videos stimulate a wide range of possible
reactions from the various established networks exposed to them. These
might range from the subsequent actions of Anonymous to the increased
solidarity of Islamic groups, to a call for peace from religious groups or
skepticism from the diplomatic community.
In short, asyngnotic networks represent a significant advancement in human
communication by allowing the real-time transmission of ideas and images
(memes) simultaneously among billions of persons. These networks are
largely resistant to language and other traditional barriers, and are only likely
to become more important as more people are linked together through the
mobile Internet and social media. Given the present global institutional
structure and political economy, the emergence of a global (mass)
consciousness largely resistant to overt or covert leadership might pose the
greatest threat to established interests and the laws that protect them as well
as pose a challenge to national security.

Practical Application of the Asyngnotic Network Approach:
Charlie Hebdo
In Paris, on January 7, 2015, Cherif and Said Kouachi, two Islamic terrorists
murdered the staff of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo using Kalashnikov
assault rifles. In leaving the criminals shouted “We have avenged the Prophet
Muhammad.” In their escape, the criminals stopped their vehicle to get out
and shoot a police officer who was lying wounded on the ground.
Approximately 3 km away, they abandoned their car, which later was found to
be stuffed with Molotov cocktails and jihadist flags. At the same time in
south-west Paris, Amedy Coulibaly shot a 32-year-old jogger in the Fontenayles- Roses park. About two hours later, the Hebdo terrorists used their
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Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenade launchers to rob an Avia petrol
station near Villers-Coutterest, north-east of Paris.83 The next day in the
morning another criminal weilding a machine gun and pistol shot dead
Clarissa Jean-Philippe, a young policewoman in Montrouge. By this time, the
police had identified the two Hebdo murderers and issued an arrest warrant.
One of the terrorists had been jailed in 2008 and had been known for a long
time for militant activities. They took refuge in the Creation Tendance
Decouverte print shop in Dammartin-en-Goele.
At 5:00pm, the Hebdo terrorists ran out of the building, guns blazing, and
were shot dead. At the same time, after another shootout, two other terrorists
Amedy Coulibaly and Hayat Boumeddiene took hostages at a kosher
supermarket in Porte de Vincennes (in the east of Paris). They demanded
freedom for the Hebdo terrorists (thus showing a connection between the two
events), but were killed approximately 15 minutes after the Kouachi brothers,
miles away. The police were given a chance to attack when the terrorists
paused to pray. They left in their wake four dead. Hayat Boumeddiene
escaped to join the genocidal ISIS group in Syria, but later was linked to the
original Hebdo terrorists by more than 500 telephone calls. Supposedly the
Hebdo attack was in response to an incitement to murder issued by a religious
authority somewhere, but that does not explain killing the young
policewoman or going after a Jewish supermarket. Omer el-Hamdoon,
president of the Muslim Association of Britain defended the murders and
claimed that publishing cartoons was not covered by freedom of speech, and
this was echoed in the Egyptian press and elsewhere.84
Only two weeks later, terrorists opened indiscriminate fire on a café in central
Copenhagen to kill the Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks. The two criminals
escaped in a Volkswagen. Shortly thereafter, a security guard working at a
synagogue was murdered, and two police officers wounded by another
gunman. This attack followed the same pattern as in Paris: First, murder
cartoonists; then murder Jews. One gunman was shot dead by police the next
morning.85 In Paris, 17 citizens and three terrorists were dead; in
Copenhagen 2 citizens and one terrorist were dead. In Copenhagen, the

Location 49 03’46.92” North; 2 41’38’60” East.
Penketh, A., Weaver, M.,.”Charlie Hebdo: first cover since terror attack depicts
prophet Muhammad,” The Guardian (2015), Online version.
85 For a timeline of the cartoon-related violence incidents, see: Staff, R., “Timeline Prophet Mohammad cartoons bring attacks to Scandinavia,” Reuters (2012) Online
version.
83
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Danish intelligence agency (PET) reported that one of the terrorists (the one
still at large) had been on their “watch list”.
It is difficult to know what intelligence could have done in advance to stop the
Hebdo attack. Immediately speculation started regarding the affiliation of the
terrorists. Were they part of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), or part of alQaida (AQ), or part of a subsidiary of AQ, or perhaps members of AQ in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)? Much of the analysis seemed to be after the fact.
This is the opposite of intelligence, which by definition must complete its
analysis prior to any event. Judging by the statements made afterwards, it is
clear that the extent of analysis was confined to compilation of watch lists of
people who were not watched and little more.
In order to employ an asyngnotic network approach to develop intelligence on
terrorist groups, it is necessary to link the abstract and ephemeral nature of
these networks with the physical reality of terrorist operations on the ground.
The asyngnotic network approach would start by recognizing that all terrorist
cells are each but one node in a complex living system that is interconnected
with other networks, mostly invisible. For example, it is clear that since the
terrorists were able to obtain heavy artillery, they were in contact with
networks that provided financing, other networks that provided training, and
yet other networks that provided logistics and distribution of terrorist
equipment. This is the physical layer of the terrorist organization.
One way to link asyngnotic networks with this physical reality is to utilize
Living Systems Theory (LST), developed by James Grier Miller, a former OSS
officer who went on to play a major role in social science. In Table 1 (above),
we have listed the twenty categories of subsystems defined by LST and then
matched them against the types of intelligence technologies and practices that
might be used to detect and monitor their associated asyngnotic networks.86
In this way, the LST model may serve as a useful starting point to hypothesize
asyngnotic networks and uncover the hidden connections that were
stimulated by the flow of those memes responsible for triggering the attacks.
In the next section we will discuss a few of the practical intelligence
challenges in identification of asyngnotic networks.

86

There is a fuller description of LST in the appendix.
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Table 1: The Charlie Hebdo Attack. Application of the living systems model
to asyngnotic network analysis. An asyngnotic network as applied to terrorism is
categorized according to different aspects of a living system.87
Subsystem
Al Qaida Instance
SIGINT HUMINT
Input Transducer (IP) Lookouts, e-mail, radio, television
l,c,d,i
v
Ingestor (IN)
Banks, mule trains, recruiting camps
$,o
f,v
Internal Transducer
Monitors incoming information and
i
X
(IT)
interprets
Channel and Net (CN) Phone and email receivers
l,n,v
v
Decoder (DE)
Internet, radio frequencies, messenger
l,n,$
c
Timer
Planning cells
f
Associator (AS)
Filing systems, target analysts,
l,d,k,g
accountants
Memory (ME)
File cabinets, disk drives, and keepers
c
Decider (DC)
Planners, now distributed over net
l,n
g,d,k
Encoder (EN)
Computer, video camera, radio/phone
l,c,y,i
c
Reproducer (RE)
Recruiters and disbursers
$
f,v
Boundary (BO)
Guards, sentries, walls
i,o
a
Distributor (DI)
Communicators, logistics, transport
o
s
Converter (CO)
Trainers
s,f
Producer (PR)
Bomb-makers
s,f
Storage (MS)
Weapons caches, inventories
v
v
Motor (MO)
Jets to mules
i,o
X
Supporter (SU)
Partisans & donors in host countries,
k,d,l,v,g
s,f,v
news media
Output Transducer
Operatives, execution cells; three men
k,y,l,p
s,f,p
(OT)
in Paris
Extruder (EX)
Graveyards, jails; under internal
o
m
security
HUMINT: Surveillance (s); Infiltration (f); SIGINT collection support (c); Passive
monitoring (m); SIGINT: Link analysis (l); Content analysis (n); Financial flows ($);
Mass media (d); Social networks (k); Cyber espionage (y); Biometrics (b);
Categorization & clustering (a); Database and Big Data (g); Event detection &
notification (v); Geospatial (o); Predictive modeling (p); Video processing (i). List
partially derived from Popp, R., Armour, T., Senator, T., Numrych, K., 2004.
Countering terrorism with information technology. Communications of the ACM 47,
36–43.

87

Based on McCreary, J., 2015. For the night of 7 January 2015. NightWatch Online.
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Discussion: Using the Asyngnotic Approach in Intelligence
The starting point of dealing with asyngnosis as leading to potential bad
outcomes is to recognize it exists and that it enhances linear police and
counterintelligence work.
The largest challenge in strategic and other kinds of warning is to “warn left of
the threat.” That is to say, to warn that information conditions are promoting
the emergence of a threat, before the threat has developed. It is low
probability warning because at this early stage the threat is one of many
potential outcomes of visible developments. It also is the time when the
emerging threat is easiest to manage.
The practical advantages of tracking asyngnotic networks are several. The
historic precedents prove the value of using memes in very early identification
of emerging threatening behavior before overt action has been detected. As
mentioned above, the most elusive challenge in warning of violent threats has
been to find a way to warn with some confidence when they are ideas before
significant action begins. The purpose is to gain time and save costs in
managing the threat environment. Once a malefactor starts to take action
other than communications, the clock starts ticking and the costs of
prevention start to rise.
A good example of asyngnotic network emergence was the unexpected
appearance of flash mobs in Cairo and Alexandria that preceded the ouster of
President Mubarak.88 The flash mobs demonstrated a propensity for
leaderless self-organization, at least in the initial stages. Leaders do emerge
or surface quickly, but not when the mob is gathering. Somebody starts the
phone-chain, but lots of other gang or cell leaders make the mob happen.
They also illustrate in real life that asyngnotic networks are real and have
impact, often significant.
U.S. intelligence missed the overthrow of Mubarak, in part, because it failed
to recognize the importance of the flash mobs. Nevertheless, the flash mob
were not the biggest impact of the memes that were floating around. The
Egyptian military leadership recognized in the memes and in the mobs that

Jurgenson, N., “When atoms meet bits: Social media, the mobile web and augmented
revolution,” Future Internet (2012) 4, 83–91.

88
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they had an opportunity to push aside Mubarak because he wanted to install
his son as his successor!
Warning at the stage of emergence, based on chatter and ideas, has always
depended on the experienced judgment of analysts. That has seldom been a
persuasive basis for action by decision makers. Before asyngnosis, there was
no systematic technique for capturing that professional judgment so it could
be more persuasive in justifying and targeting early prophylactic measures.
Asyngnosis also provides a scaffold that enables the wisdom of experienced
officers to be preserved and taught to new analysts. For example, when the
probability of a cyber or terrorist threat is low, asyngnotic analysis can enable
tracking the buildup or lack of buildup of mental intensity that will drive
action. This helps improve the accuracy and, more importantly, the
confidence of warning. As such, asyngnotic analysis is the only technique for
warning based on emergence, vs overt action.

Intelligence Antecedents to Analysis of Asyngnotic Networks
This type of analysis rests on the shoulders of earlier intelligence work. For
example, there are some aspects of content analysis as applied to propaganda
that offer an antecedent to the techniques needed to analyze asyngnotic
networks. Alexander George89 wrote the seminal book Propaganda Analysis
which described the organization and techniques use by a specialized group of
U.S. propaganda analysts during World War II. This was the predecessor of
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the Open Source
Center.90 That group had remarkable success estimating Nazi offensives and
weapons development. They studied propaganda structures and
organization, word counts, themes, the authority of the propaganda vehicle,
and the frequency of repetition of the themes. They were able to establish
thresholds for distinguishing deception and misinformation from real
developments.91

George, A.L., 1959. Propaganda Analysis. Row, Peterson, Evanston, Illinois.
The work was initially set up inside the FBI.
91 George, A.L., “Propaganda analysis: A study of inferences made from Nazi propaganda
in World War II,” Copyright - Copyright UMI - Dissertations Publishing 1959; Last
updated - 2014-01-21; First page - n/a.; George, A.L., 1954. The Scientific Status of
Propaganda Analysis,” Technical Report P-616. “The Rand Corporation. Santa Monica”;
George, A.L., 1955. “Prediction of political Action by Means of Propaganda Analysis,”
Technical Report P-779. The Rand Corporation. Santa Monica.; George, A.L., “Prediction
of political action by means of propaganda analysis,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 20,
(1956) pp. 334–345.
89

90
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In using George’s techniques to study North Korean propaganda, intelligence
analysts were able to identify the emergence of a crisis based on key word
counts, repetition, frequency, placement in the propaganda, and the authority
of the propaganda vehicle. For example, analysts learned that the threshold
for a crisis was the appearance of a meme six times in different propaganda
channels in a 24 hour period.92 This work was done manually without the
benefit of a structured analytical method, computerized assistance, or a
framework such as asyngnosis.

Cyber Exploitation of Intelligence
Uncovering an asyngnotic network may be as important as identification of a
leader operating in a traditional network, but may be more difficult.93 Doing
this poses a number of challenges for intelligence, particularly on the SIGINT
and analytical side.94 Judgment is important and when it becomes compiled
knowledge it is persuasive. Nevertheless, the promise of computerized
techniques is that they will enable the identification of thresholds for action
by non-state and state actors that are not solely based on the analyst’s gut
feeling from reading propaganda. Finally, the use of a structured technique
has special value in distinguishing genuine threats from deception, bluff,
misdirection and misinformation. Computerization will allow exploitation of
the benefits of Big Data in support of crime prevention and early warning.95
The asyngnosis approach will require the development of new language
concepts and more R&D on how to analyze memes in open sources. It also
will drive new ways of thinking about the linkage between memes and
threatening action. Those are healthy developments because the existing
techniques are not working. On the SIGINT side, there is a need for continual
“flow through” monitoring or order to capture and model asyngnotic
networks in real time. But in order to set up real-time flow-through, much
must be discovered and calibrated so that analysis is sensitive enough to bring
this phenomenon to light.
George, A.L., “The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its
aftermath,” Columbia University Press, 1967, New York.
93 The classic example of the dismantling of a terrorist network using identification of its
leadership is shown vividly in the Gillo Pontecorvo directed film La Battaglia di Algeri,
1966.
94 This discussion does not incorporate evaluation of the legal environment and any
potential privacy issues.
95 Big data is a general term for databases that are so large traditional processing
applications are inadequate to handle them. It usually refers to the use of predictive
analytics to aid in decision-making.
92
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Figure 2: SIGINT monitoring of Asyngnotic networks examines
memes flowing through both social and mass media (SMM) and
Point to Point (P2).

In each of these areas in Figure 2, the meme flow can be an undirected
broadcast (BCST) or multi-cast (MCST) or it can be associated with a specific
target (D-Target) or originate from a specific source (D-Source) or flow to a
specific person (D-Name). Traditional SIGINT monitoring is inside the red
circle. Using a meme framework allows integration of social media analysis
with traditional SIGINT.
Since asyngnotic networks may present rapid stand-up and dissolution
capabilities, it will be necessary to develop capability to identify a network
configuration as soon as it appears. After a number of these are identified, it
should be possible to generate a taxonomy of asyngnotic network types. As
latent asyngnotic networks may become visible then slide back into obscurity,
multiple iterations of network instances might be summed to isolate latent
network persistence. Frequency might initially be assumed to be synonymous
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with intensity and is an important variable because in some models it may
drive the node to the trigger threshold.96
The definition of memes may be problematical, but any result must include a
classification schema. Minimal factors for classification might be:
a) incitement to specific acts; b) examples and “teaching” of specific acts, (but
without direct incitement); c) logical arguments and Weltanschauung
triggers; specific anti- or counter-regime assumption criticism and reframing;
d) argument assist techniques such as “but what about”.97 Allowing networks
such as ISIS to post repulsive videos on websites or through social media may
aid in collection of that intelligence needed to identify and disable hidden
networks. A crucial factor in success will be choosing the best asyngnotic
network to analyze initially. Operationalization and calibration of
multichannel indexes to substitute for the flow of “actions potentials” will be
crucial. There are at least three variable classes to consider: a) channel
characteristics; b) meme classes; and c) meme frequency and intensity.98

Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the problems of asyngnotic networks and
identified a shortcoming in literature and practice regarding their analysis.
We then suggested that a neuroscience approach will be useful as an
explanatory framework because it assumes that the same type of selforganization and triggering functions can be models for asyngnotic networks.
Finally, we discussed some of the challenges for intelligence, particularly for
SIGINT, in using these models. There are many more models that can be
It might be assumed that in the general media, this is easily defined by the common
news cycle from output, to peak propagation, to decline and there are many off-the-shelf
tools that already make these calculations. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to cluster
related stories in order to estimate aggregate meme propagation trajectories. In the P2P
directed channels, traditional SIGINT measures should suffice.
97 “But what about” is a popular social media propaganda and trolling technique.
Example: “Russia is complicating solution of the Syrian problem because of its continued
support for the Assad government.” Refrain: “But what about US support for the nondemocratic Saudi monarchy?” The point is to drive attention away from the original idea.
98 Johnson (Johnson, R., “Developing a taxonomy of intelligence analysis variables,”
Studies in Intelligence (2003) 47) presents a taxonomy of variables used in intelligence
analysis including a) systemic variables; b) systematic; c) idiosyncratic; and
d) communicative, asyngnotic networks require careful attention to a different set of
variable parameters. Because of the multi-channel nature of an asyngnotic network, the
testing and variable calibration must be able to encompass several types of meme flows
including a) close circuit broadcasts; b) point to point directed and names; c) social and
mass media general; and d) social and mass media general directed targeted. See
Figure 2. NB: the class of media general directed source is excluded because it is too
obvious.
96
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harnessed to surface asyngnotic networks, but we hope this short discussion
has stimulated discussion regarding the potential for this approach.
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Appendix A. Full Statement of Anonymous99
Greetings citizens of the world. We are Anonymous. Operation ISIS
Continues. First, we need to clarify few a things. We are: Muslims, Christians,
Jews. We Are hackers, crackers, hacktivists, phishers, agents, spies, or just
the guy from next door. We are students, administrators, workers, clerks,
unemployed, rich, poor. We are young, or old, gay or straight. We wear
smart clothes or rugs. We are hedonists, ascetics, joy riders or activists. We
come from all races, countries, religions, and ethnicity. United as one,
divided by zero. We are Anonymous.
Remember: The terrorists that are calling themselves Islamic State, (ISIS),
are not Muslims! ISIS. We will hunt you, take down your sites, accounts,
emails, and expose you. From now on, no safe place for you online. You will
be treated like a virus, and we are the cure. We own the Internet.
We are Anonymous. We are legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget.
Expect us.

This is a transcript of the full statement from Anonymous released with its reports on
#OpISIS.

99
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Appendix B. Symbolic Notation
The notation for Hebbian Plasticity and McCulloch-Pitts can be adapted for
quantitative analysis of social media and other content.100
Note: The notation for standardized link analysis has been excluded since it is
widely published and known.
Hebbian Plasticity for Asyngnotic Terrorist Networks
This refers to the assumption that the brain or asyngnotic organization learns
through the repetitive stimulation and resulting strengthening of linkages
between nodes. It is given by ∆𝑊𝑖𝑗 ∝ 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗 where i is the previous network
node and j is the downstream node. As a result, 𝑊𝑖𝑗 becomes proportional to
the statistical correlation between the activities of i and j. Co-variance is
another way to state Hebbian Plasticity. The covariance rule is ∆𝑊𝑖𝑗 ∝ (𝑥𝑖 −<
𝑥𝑗 >)(𝑥𝑗 −< 𝑥𝑖 >) with < 𝑥𝑖 > being the average activity for node i. In this
approach, Wij becomes proportional to the covariance between the activities
of nodes i and j.
Adaption of McCulloch-Pitts
McCulloch-Pitts uses θ as a surge parameter with inflowing memes being
either stimulating or general and thus being coded in a binary manner as “0”
or “1”. The node takes action when the threshold is met. By connecting one
node to another, intermediated by meme flows, it is possible to estimate
whether any node will take action. The linear threshold (LT) model uses
𝑥𝑖 (𝑡 + 1) = 𝐻 (∑𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗 (𝑡) − 𝜃𝑗 ) which allows for a variety of incoming
memes at a specific time 𝑥1 (𝑡), 𝑥2 (𝑡) ⋯ 𝑥𝑁 (𝑡) with each meme being valued at
“0” or “1” representing regular information or other information that is
stimulating to the node to take action (such as launch an attack at time (t +
1)). Each arriving meme is multiplied by the Hebbian strength of the pathway
it arrives on. As long as the sum is less than the threshold, then there is no
action taken. But if the value either reaches or exceeds the threshold θ, then
See for example Stanley Wasserman & Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis:
Methods and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pps. 71-83 for (1) graph
theoretic notation (single relation; multiple relations); (2) sociometric notation; and
(3) algebraic notation. For applications, see Xu, J.J. & Chen, H., CrimeNet Explorer: A
Framework for Criminal Network Knowledge Discovery, ACM Transactions on
Information Systems, 23(2), April 2005, pp. 201-226; Link Analysis Workbench, Air
Force Research Laboratory Information Directorate, Rome Research Site, Rome, New
York, September 2004.
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it will trigger the node to take action. The continuous model of the same is
given by 𝜏

𝑑𝑟(𝑖)
𝑑𝑡

+ 𝑟𝑖 = 𝐹 (∑𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑟𝑗 − 𝜃𝑗 ) where 𝜏 is a constant and rj is a

graded variable rather than a binary variable, so it responds to the frequency
of communication or intensity of the incoming memes.
Nodes
Nodes can be thought of as parts of a networked organization. Generally, they
are either individuals or organizations themselves as the unit of analysis.
Memes
A term that refers to communication of ideas. In a model of asyngnotic
networks that has a neuroscience orientation, the flow of memes is equated
with the flow of the action potential along the pathways linking one neuron to
another.
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Appendix C. Uncovering Asyngnotic networks using
Living Systems Theory (LST)
Further evidence that complex human networks may undergo a type of selforganization is found in a branch of science called general systems theory.101
Much of this work focused on identifying universal principles of systems that
are equally true whether applied to living organisms at the cellular level or at
the level of human society. In the Living Systems Theory (LST) model,
networks operate as self-organization systems.102 The LST approach came out
of general systems research that developed an extensive vocabulary to discuss
organizations.103 In the LST model, there are nineteen critical subsystems
divided into three classes: a) systems that process both matter-energy and
information; b) systems that process matter-energy; and c) systems that
process information. By dispensing with the matter-energy subsystems, we
are left with nine subsystems that pertain only to processing of information
including: a) Input Transducer (IP); b) Internal Transducer (IT); c) Channel
and Net (CN); d) Decoder (DE); e) Associator (AS); f) Memory (ME); g)
Decider (DC); h) Encoder (EN); and i) Output Transducer (OT).104 Adding the
timer completes the list of twenty subsystems.

The concept of a system involves control, if there is no control, then there is no system
(Hammond, D., Wilby, J., “The life and work of James Grier Miller,” Systems Research
and Behavioral Science (2006) 23, 429–435).
102 James Grier Miller was the creator of LST. He served in the OSS. See Miller, J.G.,
“My role in the assessment program of the Office of Strategic Services,” Behavioral
Science (1996) 41, 245–261
103 Robbins, S.S., Oliva, T.A., “The empirical identification of fifty-one core general
systems theory vocabulary components,” Behavioral Science (1982) 27, 377–386.
104 See also Miller, J.G. Mater-energy processing subsystems. The extruder. Behavioral
Science 38, 46-57 for the extruder matter-energy processing system, which may be
thought of as waste by-products; the producer (Miller, Ibid, The Producer, pp. 46-57) who
synthesizes materials internally for the network; the ingestor which would include
recruitment and gathering of resources for the terrorist network (Miller, Ibid, pp. 10-18);
the distributor which would include logistics (Miller, Ibid, pp. 19-32); the converter
storage; motor; and the supporters which would include sympathetic persons in the
community. All of these appear in the 38th volume of Behavioral Science (1993).
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